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The decision of the European Court of Justice in the GrundigConsten case' in July, 1966 dramatically illustrates the evolving relationship between supranational European Economic Community
Treaty law and the national law of the member countries.2 A series
of cases dealing with the legitimacy under the provisions of the Treaty
of Rome' of exclusive distributorship agreements whose territorial
limits are coterminous with the boundaries of member countries has
been litigated in recent years before national courts and the EEC
Commission. Grundig is the first of this series to be adjudicated upon
its merits by the European Court.
f Counsel, Overseas Subsidiaries & Investments, General Electric Company.
Former Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1939, A.M. 1940, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1943 (1946), Harvard Law School.
I Etablissements Consten v. Soci6ti Union Nationale des Economies Familiales
(UNEF), S.A.R.L. Citations and quotations from the Court of Justice opinion,
appearing hereafter, have been taken from the English translation published in 2 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. %8046 at 7618-57 (1966).
2 An earlier, preliminary comment on Grundig-Consten, prepared before the
Court's ruling, took the form of a paper delivered in March, 1964 at a regional
meeting of the American Society of International Law at Syracuse University and
published as Ebb, Common Market Law in Process, 41 WAsn. L. REv. 489 (1966).
The present article, while drawing its expository material from its predecessor, takes
a fresh look at Grundig in the light of the July 13, 1966 decision of the Court of Justice,
pertinent data and arguments presented to the Court by the parties and the Advocate
General, and other recent developments.
3 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
ratified by the member states of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and
The Netherlands during that year and effective as of Jan. 1, 1958.
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The competitive requirements of Treaty anti-cartel law inevitably
impinge upon and interact with private claims of right based upon
the national law of trademark, unfair competition and resale price
maintenance. The very analysis of the empirical data presented in
Grundig and related cases, and the pragmatic process of fashioning
decisions and judicial remedies in the cases, now force these relationships to be considered more fully and meaningfully by courts, administrators and commentators than was feasible when the Common Market
was created. The development of legal standards governing these
relationships under the compulsions and stimuli of the empirical
process, confers a degree of precision and specificity upon postlitigation drafting of EEC regulations that was lacking in earlier regulations adopted without reference to actual cases. 4 At the same time,
the national law of the member countries has undergone some change
and growth, and may be on the verge of much greater change-partly
because of the direct impact of Treaty standards, and partly because
of more subtle internal development and modification of national doctrines in response to the trade liberalization principles of the Common
Market. It is the impact of the Rome Treaty on national legal doctrines and the nature of the response that can be anticipated from
national courts in applying and reformulating those doctrines that
is the special concern of this case-study. This aspect of change may
fairly be termed one of judicial harmonization of national law with
treaty law.
The Grunudig case made its way through the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine (1962),' the Paris Court of Appeal (1963),' and
4 Compare E.E.C. Regulation No. 17 of Feb. 6, 1962, the first implementing regulation under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, as in CAMPBELL, REsTrICE TRADING
AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMON MARKET 29 (1964), with the Regulation proposed on
Aug. 26, 1966 and adopted effective May 1, 1967 on the Application of Article 85 (3)
of the Treaty to Certain Groups of Bilateral Exclusive Dealing Agreements and
Concerted Practices, 2 CCH Comm. MET. REP. 8273; 1 id. at 1819. The Regulation sets
forth criteria for determining which types of exclusive distributorships may generally
be deemed to be exempt from the Treaty's ban on cartels by virtue of the exemptive
provision of article 85(3), see text quoted in note 23 infra, and in so doing specifies
certain restrictive practices, including those involved in the Grundig case, which will
not be subject to such exemption. Some of these "non-exemptible" restrictive practices had apparently been identified as such at the time or soon after Regulation 17
was promulgated. However, we know this not from the wording of Regulation 17,
but rather from comments contained in an informal "Manual for Firms," the "'Practical Guide' to Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and the Relevant Regulations,"
issued by the Commission on Sept. 2, 1962, 1 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. 2801, at 1970-71
especially. The new Regulation was proposed the month after the Court's ruling
on Grundig,with the illuminating explanation that "since the Commission has acquired
sufficient experience, particularly on the basis of individual decisions, it is appropriate
to issue such a regulation . . . ." 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. i[ 9125, at 8273. See
text accompanying note 56 infra, concerning the content of these regulations.
5 Etablissements Consten v. Socit6 "U.N.E.F.," S.A.R.L. (Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, le chambre, Paris, May 21, 1962) (opinion apparently not published,
at the court).
but available
6
Soci6t6 Union Nationale des Economies Familiales v. Etablissements Consten,
2 CCH Comm. MEr. REP. 118009 (Cour d'appel, le chambre, Paris, 1963).
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the EEC Commission at Brussels (1964),' and was reviewed on
appeal by the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg. Oral argument was presented early in March 1966; the German and Italian
Governments submitted briefs on behalf of the Grundig position; and
the firms of Willy Leissner of Strasbourg and UNEF of Paris presented briefs supporting the views of the Commission. The Advocate
General presented Conclusions supporting, in large part, the Commission's reasoning, but urging the court to reverse its holding. The
decision of the Court of Justice was handed down on July 13, 1966.
The issues in the proceedings were the validity of Grundig's
system of absolute territorial protection of its sales organization under
the local law of the EEC country-in this case, France-and under
article 85,8 the anti-cartel provision of the Treaty of Rome, and its
implementing regulations. These territorial divisions are based on
contractual terms that bar all Grundig purchasers, German and foreign,
from exporting or re-exporting, and are further supported by certain
national trademark arrangements with each national distributor.
In 1957, the Grundig sales company, Grundig Verkaufs G.m.b.H.,
entered into a contract with Etablissements Consten designating the
latter as sole sales representative 9 for continental France, the Saar and
Corsica for radios, tape recorders, dictating machines and television
sets manufactured by Grundig. Grundig agreed not to sell, directly
7 The Grundig-Consten litigation, as it appeared before the Commission of the
EEC, No. IV-A/004-03344, is translated in 1 CCH Comm. MKTc.REP. ff 2743.
8 Treaty article 85(1) provides in part:
The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all agreements betveen undertakings, all decisions by associations of undertakings and all concerted practices which are liable to affect
trade between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or
distort competition within the Common Market or which have this effect.
This shall, in particular, include:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of
any other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or investment; . . .
9 The commercial relationship dealt with in this article is, technically, that between
a manufacturer in one EEC country and his exclusive distributor (a person or firm
dealing for its own account) in another. This relationship should be distinguished, generally, from that of the manufacturer and a dependent sales representative, who, for
example, may sell on a commission basis. The dependent agency relationship does
not raise the same problems of possible violation of the anti-cartel provisions of the
Treaty of Rome as those raised in the Grundig-Consten situation. See, e.g., the
EEC Commission's Official Notice on Contracts for Exclusive Representation Concluded With Commercial Agents, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. It 2697 (Dec. 24, 1962).
However, the rulings by the Commission and the Court in Grundig-Consten characterize the exclusive distributorship arrangement actually involved there by such
additional terms as "sole sales representative" and "sole agency agreement."
For
convenience in paraphrasing or quoting from these opinions, the author has correspondingly used these terms. This explanatory note is inserted in the hope that
it will help the reader to recall that, notwithstanding the usage of such conceivably
ambiguous terms, Grundig-Consten did not involve any dependent agency or "commercial agent" relationship.
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or indirectly, to other persons in the territory ceded to Consten. In
pursuit of that undertaking, Grundig imposed an export prohibition
upon German distributors as well as its distributors in other Common
Market countries. Some of these distributors, nevertheless, made
deliveries to an unauthorized French importer, UNEF, the defendant
in the original action brought by Consten. UNEF in turn sold this
equipment to French retailers at prices lower than those asked by
Consten, to the detriment of dealers who purchased from Consten.
To complete the picture of the territorially protective distribution
system, it should be added that Grundig maintains trademark registrations in each of the EEC countries, holding the Grundig mark in its
own name. A companion mark, GINT (Grundig International), is
held by Grundig in its own name in Germany, but the sole national
agent in each of the other countries-Consten in France-holds that
mark as a further protection against "parallel" imports by others."0
It is noteworthy that the first major controversy over the interpretation of EEC law in the anti-cartel field involves a "vertical"
contract, rather than a horizontal combination of manufacturers or of
distributors. The vertical arrangement of sole distributorships has
belatedly emerged in the United States as a significant issue under
the Sherman Act and the FTC Act -witness the recent White
Motor Co.' and Snap-On Tools 3 cases. The Italian Government,
in opposing the Commission's decision, argued unsuccessfully before
10 The GINT trademark arrangements are described in detail in note 44 infra
and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Timberg, TerritorialExclisives, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1966) ; Note,
Restrictive Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. REV. 795
(1962).
12United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961):
summary judgment holding that exclusive distributorships in specified territories
constitute per se violations of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court reversed, 372
U.S. 253 (1963), on the ground that
the applicable rule of law should be designed after a trial. This is the first
case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we know
too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respecting
customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us. .

.

. [Vertical arrangements]

may be too dangerous to

sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors
or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking in or staying
in business. .

.

. and within the "rule of reason."

The litigation was concluded, however, by the consent of White Motor Company to
the entry of a decree barring it from engaging in any exclusive territorial arrangements. 1964 Trade Cas. 71,195.
In arguing that the Commission had failed to make an adequate survey of the
relevant inter-brand competition and thus had erred in concluding that article 85(1)
was violated by the Grundig agreements, Advocate General Karl Roemer cited the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in White Motor as a persuasive analogy supporting
his thesis. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 8046 at 7662.
'3 Snap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
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the Court of Justice that vertical arrangements cannot even be deemed
to infringe article 85(1) of the Treaty.'4
On the other hand, it should not be unduly surprising that an anticartel system put into effect in Europe in 1958 has been preoccupied
at the outset of its operations with a type of restrictive practice-related
to consumer product distribution arrangements-of scant initial interest to the executors of the American antitrust system. The Sherman
Act appeared in the United States in 1890 during a period of public
concern about the great trusts and combinations in basic industries
such as rail transportation and petroleum. The fact that the United
States Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
American courts pay some heed today to the problems of vertical distribution agreements, and the existence of economic and social factors
which account for that growing interest, should be more significant to
the American observer of Common Market developments than the
mere fact that the initial concern of the two enforcement groupscomparing 1890 with 1958-is so different. Equally significant is
the fact that postwar French and German regulatory law has applied
or has been deemed to apply to a variety of restrictive distribution
practices, in addition to the problems of monopoly and merger.' 5
E.E.C. Regulation No. 17 of Feb. 6, 1962, the first implementing
regulation under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,' spelled out the
Commission's concern with exclusive distribution agreements, reportedly at the insistence of the French.' 7 Regulation 17 in turn led
to the filing with the Commission, in order to obtain its "negative
clearance" approval, of some 35,000 exclusive distribution agreements
(among them the Grundig-Consten agreement), a fact which helps to
account for the early emergence of this problem in litigation before
the Commission and the Court of Justice.
The development of the Grundig litigation may be briefly summarized: the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine held UNEF liable
14 See 2 CCH CoMM. MicT. REP. 8046 at 7625-26, 7661-65. A broader but
equally unsuccessful attack on the decision was launched by the German and Italian
Governments, Grundig, Consten, and the Advocate General on the ground that a
factual investigation would disclose that all conditions necessary for the grant of an
exemption under article 85(3), quoted at note 23 infra, were present in this case.
Compare 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046 at 7671-80 with the Court's evaluation of
this question, id. at 7644-49, 7655-57.

See also Deringer, Exclusive Agenwy Agree-

inents With Territorial Protection Under the EEC Antitrust Laws, 10

ANTrIRUST

BULL. 599 (1965).

15 See

GRAUPNER,

THE RULES

Or COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN EcoNoMIc

91-131 (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), and consider particularly
the French Decree of June 24, 1958 (No. 58-545), prohibiting refusals to deal in
certain circumstances, id. at 110-14. See also the Advocate General's Conclusions
in Grundig, 2 CCH CoMM. MicT. REP. 1 8046 at 7661-64.
16 See note 4 supra; text accompanying note 56 infra.
1*tSee GRAuPNER, supra note 15, at 110.
COMMUNrrY
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in damages to Consten for unfair competition, because of wilful disregard of the sole agency agreement of which it had knowledge, and
enjoined UNEF from further sales of Grundig products in the
Consten distributorship territory; the Paris Court of Appeal reversed
the ruling of the trial court, holding that the latter should have stayed
the proceedings until UNEF's complaint-filed with the Director
General of Restrictive Practices to seek a declaration that the sole
distributor agreement was void as an infringement of article 85 of the
Treaty 's-had been passed upon by the EEC Commission.?9
The Commission's Ruling and Rationale
The EEC Commission thereupon ruled," ° on the merits, that the
Grundig-Consten agreement coupled with the export ban imposed on
all buyers of Grundig products, and further supported by the importban privileges enjoyed under French law by Consten as holder of the
GINT trademark, violated article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty. In
the words of the Treaty provision, it found that these arrangements
constitute "agreements between enterprises . . . and .

.

. concerted

practices which are likely to affect trade between the member states
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market." 21 The major
vice of the sole agency agreement in this case was the furnishing of
absolute territorial protection, designed to prevent parallel imports
into the Consten territory-the French market.2 2 The exemptive
18 See also Soci&6 Arlab Import-Export (SARIE) v. Sociti Union Nationale
des Economies Familiales (UNEF) S.A.R.L., 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 185 (1963) (Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, Paris, 1962).
19 The Grunlig and companion cases all pose interesting procedural questions
related to the phasing of action by national tribunals and the EEC administrative
and judicial bodies, but this paper does not purport to explore them. For a study of
those problems, see Alexander, The Domestic Courts and Article 85 of the Rome
Treaty, 1 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 431 (1964); Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction over Antitrust Matters in the E.E.C., 52 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1964); Note,
1 Comm. MxT. L. REv. 223 (1963).
The chronology is interesting from a procedural point of view. UNEF had filed
its petition to have the Commission invalidate the agreement on March 5, 1962. The
Court of Appeal decision was handed down on Jan. 26, 1963. And, "as a precaution"
(1 CCH Comm. MKT. RE1. 112743 at 1863), on Jan. 29, 1963 Grundig filed with the
Commission the exclusive distributorship agreements that it had concluded with Consten and others in the Common Market.
20 See 1 CCH Comm. MiT. REP. 2743.
21 Treaty, article 85 (1).
2 The Commission has indicated elsewhere that, in the absence of an export ban
imposed upon buyers from the manufacturer or original wholesaler, exclusive distributorship agreements covering national territories may be treated as exempt from
the prohibitions of article 85(1) of the Treaty. See, e.g., Communication re Commission Notification No. IV/A-02702, Official Journal No. 165, Oct. 22, 1964, quoted
in 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 9002 (exclusive distributorship given by German manufacturer of cultivators and tractors to Brussels firm for sales in Belgium and Luxembourg, the distributor being free to set its own prices and subject to no restriction
on its right to resell-and presumably to do so by re-export-to third parties) ; and
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provisions of article 85(3) - were found inapplicable since the Commission concluded that any generalized economic benefits that resulted
from the Grundig arrangements were not dependent upon those restrictive provisions that established absolute territorial protection.
The vice perceived by the EEC Commission in the Grundig exclusive distribution arrangements was the imposition upon Grundig's
non-French distributors of an agreement not to export from their
national territories, plus the equipping of the French distributor with
a trademark that was used to hamper imports by parallel importers.
Accordingly, the Commission banned "absolute territorial protection"
as being "particularly damaging to the realization of the Common
Market since it impeded or prevented an assimilation of market conditions in the Common Market for the products covered by the
agreement."
To keep open the possibility of parallel imports into
France, the Commission enjoined Grundig and Consten "from making
more difficult or from hampering parallel imports of Grundig products
into France by any means whatsoever, including the use for this purpose of the GINT trademark." 24 This does not mean, of course, that
Consten is barred from using the GINT trademark in all circumNotification No. IV/A-22491, Official Journal No. 179, Nov. 7, 1964, 2 CCH CoMM.

REP. f 9004 (exclusive distributorship between French manufacturer and German
distributor in one case, and with Belgian distributor in the other, neither agreement
containing an export prohibition). Compare the Commission's ruling in the "D.R.U.
Blondel case," discussed at note 79 infra. The mechanics for assuring that such
exclusive arrangements are not subject to article 85(1) where no application has
been filed for a "negative clearance" under 85(1) or for an exemption under 85(3),
are complicated. See Soci&ti Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H.,
Court of Appeal of Paris, First Chamber July 7, 1965, referring a set of questions
to the European Court of Justice, which answered them in its opinion of June 30,
1966, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8047. See also comment in 2 CCH COMM. MXT.
REP. 1[ 9074 and the discussion of new Regulation No. 67/67, in the text accompanying
note 56 infra.
MKT.

23 Article

85 (3) provides:
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
-any agreement or type of agreement between undertakings,
-any decision or type of decision by associations of undertakings,
and
-any concerted practice or type of concerted practice
which helps to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting profit and which does not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which
are not indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect of
a substantial part of the goods concerned.
The Commission evaluated the highly-protected sole agency agreements here as
impeding, if not preventing, the integration of the national markets into the Common
Market, citing the fact that Grundig products sold in France at prices 20%'0 higher
than German prices, after deducting customs duties and taxes from the French prices.
24 1 CCII CoMm. MKT. REP. 1 2743 at 1868-69.
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stances. For example, it could be used as against those selling
products not originating from the Grundig factories and falsely
labelled "GINT."
The Court of Justice Ruling and the Separability Issue
The Court of Justice, which in general sustained the Commission's findings and rulings, reversed the decision in one particular.
The Commission had held that the exclusive distributorship agreement
of 1957 and the supplementary agreement on the registration and use
of the GINT trademark by Consten violated article 85. The Court
ruled that the illicit portions of the 1957 Agreement were separable from
the remainder of that agreement, and that the Commission had not furnished sufficient reasons to demonstrate that the entire agreement violated article 85. It may well be questioned whether the Commission had
intended to terminate all aspects of the main and supplemental agreements, or, at least, whether it intended to terminate them irrevocably.
The Commission emphatically meant to enjoin compliance with those
parts of the arrangement that it had identified as constituting absolute
territorial protection, but it expressly preserved certain nonrestrictive
rights arising out of the agreements, as indicated by the comment
quoted in the preceding paragraph concerning Consten's continued
rights to use the GINT trademark. Indeed, in defending its ruling
before the Court of Justice, the Commission urged that its "finding of
a contract's incompatability with article 85, paragraph 1, does not
say anything yet on the civil-law validity of individual clauses on
which the Commission had made no statements." 28
As to any broader validation of the agreements, pruned of their
illegitimate features, the Commission contemplated that the parties
would take the initiative in reforming their agreements in order to
perpetuate them: "The parties to the agreement have continued to
apply the sole agency agreement, and they have not modified it so that
it no longer falls under the prohibition of article 85, paragraph 1, or
so that this agreement may be declared exempt under article 85,
paragraph 3 ..

27

With the support of the Advocate General,

however, Grundig and the German Government urged that the sequence
foreseen by the Commission was a "violation of procedural rights," and
that the Commission itself should have specified those portions of the
contract that it deemed to survive the prohibitions of its decree.
Otherwise, it was reasoned, the reformation of the contract to conform
2

5Ibid.

26 2 id.
271

8046 at 7665.

id. 2743 at 1868.
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with the Commission's decree would be made by a member state
tribunal that lacked the expertise of the Commission, thus leading to
the possibility of "conflicting decisions on the part of the courts of the
different Member States." 28 To require the enterprises concerned to
modify their agreement and resubmit it to a second notification proceeding before the Commission would involve unnecessary delay and
create unreasonable uncertainty in the interim2
It was argued that
the Commission should be required to delimit precisely which parts
of an agreement are, and which parts are not "relevant" to the anticartel provisions-unless it were perfectly clear that "without the
expressly discussed parts of an agreement the parties would have declined to retain the balance of it." " Underlying this view, which the
Court of Justice adopted, may be the fact that under the German anticartel law the Federal Cartel Office follows the practice of sanctioning
particular contract provisions, while invalidating other sections in
the agreement. 1
On the other hand, it would appear that national contract law,
interpreted and applied by national tribunals, will ultimately govern
the question of separability and the survival of the distributorship
agreement stripped of its illicit provisions. Thus the Court's modification of the Commission's ruling should be viewed as simply intended to compel the Commission to play a larger role in the contractreformation stage of the process. By being required to indicate more
dearly the permissible contents of a reformed contract, the Commission would clarify that portion of the post-decree situation, although
the national tribunals, if called upon to do so by one of the parties,
presumably would still have to determine whether a contract thus
altered remains viable in terms of the intent of the parties. For
example, the Commission, in its 1964 ruling, stated that the supplemental trademark agreement could not be validated as an exemption
under article 85(3) since it "merely provides an additional means
of guaranteeing absolute territorial protection" and for that reason is
"too closely connected with the sole agency agreement." I Yet the
transfer of GINT to Consten, which occurred under the aegis of that
supplementary agreement, was deemed valid and Consten retains its
rights to the mark so long as it does not exercise import-ban privileges
id. 1 8046 at 7627.
0 Id. at 7666.

28 2
2

30 Ibid. The Advocate General noted elsewhere in his argument, id. at 7681,
that the enterprises appeared willing at least in some circumstances to continue the
agreement in modified form, citing particularly a separability clause in the exclusive
distributorship contract.
81 Deringer, Exclusive Agency Agreements With Territorial Protection Under
the EEC Antitrust Laws, 10 ANTITRUST BuLL. 599, 607 (1965).
32 1 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. 1f2743 at 1868.
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against genuine Grundig-GINT products. Is Grundig still entitled to
retrieve the GINT mark upon termination of the Consten distributorship? Presumably it should be deemed to retain that right; otherwise
Grundig may be less agreeable than the Commission to Consten's
continued exercise of trademark rights following the decree. Possibly
questions of this nature led Grundig to argue that "the opinion of
the Commission presents practical difficulties that defy solution." '
It will be interesting to see how the Commission carries out the
Court's mandate, since on argument before the Court it appeared to
feel that illegality tainted more than the export ban and the abusive
application of the GINT mark. It stated that "considerable difficulties
are encountered in any efforts to draw a precise line between the
contract provisions that are relevant under cartel law and those that
are neutral from the cartel angle, for example, if an impairment of
competition results only from the interplay of several clauses." "
The Import-Ban Privileges of Trademark Holders Under the
National Law of EEC Member Countries
Underlying the basic ruling on the illicit aspects of the supplemental trademark agreement is the fact that the industrial property
law of some countries (occasionally bolstered by national customs
law) " arms the holder of the trademark with the privilege of barring
imports of goods labelled with that mark, even though they are
"genuine" goods, emanating from the same manufacturer as the goods
sold by the trademark-holder. Whether or not French law confers
such an import-ban privilege on the holder of a trademark is not
perfectly clear, as is indicated by a close scrutiny of the GrundigConsten case. The superficial implication of the rulings discussed
below is that, absent article 85, French law would confer such importban privileges on those holding the French trademark.
If such broad powers are in fact conferred by trademark law,
France is more generous to trademark holders' control over foreign
imports than many of the other West European countries. There has
been a long-standing conflict between two schools of thought about
trademark and unfair competition law-between the "territoriality"
:332 id. 8046 at 7627. Other contract clauses whose fate under the anti-cartel
ruling expressly concerned the enterprises were "the purchase restriction imposed
upon Consten [presumably the undertaking not to deal with competing products]
and . . . numerous other contract clauses which deal with terms of sales [presumably
including the continued exclusivity of Consten's distributorship], terms of delivery,
terms of payment, retention of title, guarantee, assumption of risk, applicable law,
and jurisdiction of courts." Id. at 7665.
341d. at 7665.
35 See, e.g., EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss

460-96 (1964).
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and "universality" concepts with respect to the rights of exclusive
importer-distributors. Case law since World War II has tended to
favor "universality," particularly in Germany and Switzerland.3
In
general, the territoriality school views the holder of a registered trademark (or the exclusive-distributor-licensee under the trademark) who
imports a product manufactured under a corresponding trademark
registered in another country, as entitled to bar others from importing
his supplier's genuine foreign-made goods. The universality school,
by contrast, regards the world as the domain for the manufactureroriginal holder of the trademark in the country of origin of the
product, with the result that his trademark rights and privileges are
protected only against spurious products in his own and other
countries, despite his acquisition of separate national registrations of
the trademark in other countries. Correspondingly, his exclusivedistributor licensee or transferee in another country does not possess
the right to bar imports by others of the genuine trademarked product.
Thus the German Supreme Court recently ruled that the German exclusive distributor of "Maja" soap products (manufactured in Spain),
who also held an exclusive license to use the trademark "Maj a" registered in Germany by the Spanish manufacturer, could not bar parallel
imports of products bearing the corresponding mark."
36

Although Switzerland is not an EEC country, its commentary literature and

judicial decisions on this question appear to be very influential in the EEC countries.
37
Judgment of Jan. 22, 1964 (Bundesgerichtshof),

in [1964]

GEwERBLICHER

TEU. [GRUR]
202 (Ger.). See also EBB, .mpra note 35, at 490-93 (reprinting excerpts from SABA,
Radio-, Televisions- & Elektro A.G. v. Eschenmoser, 84(IV) Entscheidungen des
Sclhweizerischen Bundesgerichtes, Aintliche Saminlig [BGE] 119 (Kassationshofes
1958 (Switz.)); 51 TRADEmARK REP. 141 (1961) (commenting on Philips A.G. v.
Radio Import G.m.b.H., 86(11) BGE 270 (Bundesgericht 1960) (Switz.)). If the
product were one manufactured separately in the second country, rather than simply
imported there, the trademark-holder would be more successful in barring imports
of the product from other countries; among other things, variations in product specifications in the factories located in different countries may serve as a reasonable
basis for maintaining this territorial right. See, e.g., EBB, supra note 35, at 482-87
(reprinting excerpts from Seifenfabrik Sunlight A.G. v. Migros-Genossenschaftsbund
& Konsorten, 78(11) BGE 164 (Bundesgericht 1952) (Switz.)) ; id. at 494 (summarizing with comment Istituti Burlando v. Palmolive S.P.A. (Corte di Cassazione
1956) in [1957] RrSTA DELLA PROPRIETA INTELLETUALE E INDUSTRIALE 71 and in
[1957] II RIVlSTA DI Dmrrro INDUSTRIALE 358 (Italy)).
For an interesting contrast to the German Supreme Court's decision in Maja, see
Survey of Literature, 2 Comm. MKT. L. Ray. 109, 118 (1964) (noting Judgment of
Jan. 17, 1964 (Oberlandesgericht, Hamm), in [1964] AusssNwivTscrAFrSnlzNsT
124, and in [1964] GRUR 636 (Ger.)). In the latter case, the German holder of the
trademark Persil successfully enjoined a Dutch exporter from bringing "Persil"
products into Germany. Article 85 could not properly be invoked against the trademark import-ban privilege, the court asserted, since that article is not directed "against
those limitations to interstate commerce which follow from the trademark laws, which
are built up according to the principle of territoriality."
As to the scope of the import-ban privilege of the trademark holder under German trademark law, however, the apparent inconsistency between the Maja and Persil
decisions disappears on closer examination. Unlike the Maja situation, the holder
of the German mark Perril was not a foreign manufacturer who also held the corRECHTSSCHUTZ UND URMBERRECHiT, AUSLANDSUND

INTERISATIOiALER
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The metaphysical rationales of the two concepts are absorbing
and infinitely complex, but they are not a matter of extended concern
for the purposes of this article. Those interested in the reasoning
What is relevant
of the two schools may probe further elsewhere.3
for this study is the trend toward applying the universality principle
to curb the import-ban powers of exclusive distributors within national
territories in Western Europe, a striking parallel to the conclusion
of the EEC Commission that the Treaty itself, by virtue of article 85,
curbs the international trade restrictive efforts of exclusive distributors
relying upon national trademark privileges. Indeed, it may well be
that the trade-integrating result of the universality principle springs
from much the same judicial attitude towards international trade and
private restrictive trade practices as the underlying reasoning of those
who drafted and those who are now implementing the Treaty.
A potential source of conflict between national and treaty law in
the fields of cartel, trademark and unfair competition law may be
minimized by virtue of the fact that in at least some of the member
countries, the development of national law recently has proceeded along
lines paralleling those implicit in Common Market law. It should
also be noted, as a further parallel development, that a committee of
representatives of the six Common Market countries prepared a Draft
Convention on European Patent Law in 1962, and trademark experts
in 1964 completed a draft (as yet unpublished) of a convention for a
system of European trademarks. It is intended that the Trademark
Convention, like the proposed Patent Convention, will result in a
Common Market registry for a trademark that would have as its
"territory" the whole Common Market area. In effect, this would be
a trademark based on the universal principle with respect to intercountry relationships within the supranational area, an area within
which exclusive distributor-importers-even under national law conresponding mark abroad. Nor was the holder of German Persil a mere distributor
of a foreign product imported into Germany. Rather, it was the German manufacturer
of the product involved. Moreover, there was not even a close relationship between
the German and Dutch manufacturers, the Dutch company having obtained possession
of the mark in The Netherlands after governmental confiscation of the mark during
World War I.
38 See generally EBB, supra note 35, at 460-96; Derenberg, TerritorialScope and
Sitwr of Trademarks and Goodwill, 2 0TH CENTURY C mPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW
419 (Nadelmann ed. 1961) ; Derenberg, The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Tradeiarks in Foreign Commerce, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 414 (1952); Vandenburgh, The
Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a Trademark Problem,
49 TRADEmARX RE. 707 (1959); Waelbroeck, Trademark Problems in the European
Common Market, 54 TRADEmARK REP. 333 (1964). Recent foreign literature is
increasingly more abundant. See, e.g., Benucci, Ablso del Marchio (con particolare
riguardo a intese e practiche restrittive della concorrenza), 62 RIViSTA DEL Drarrro
CoammsclALE 251, 272 (1964); Birk, Die Grenzen des TerritorialitiitsprinzipsWaren-

zeichenrecht, 17 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHanr [N.J.W.] 1596 (1964); R6ttger,
Das Territorialitditsprinsipiun Warenzeichenrecht, [1964] GRUR 125.
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sidered in isolation-could not bar imports of a product manufactured
and affixed with the corresponding trademark in another EEC
country.3 9

By contrast, American courts, after an early adherence to the
universal view with respect to exclusive distributor-importers," moved
to the territorial viewpoint expounded by Mr. Justice Holmes in the
Bourjois case, 4 ' apparently under the influence of a very considerable
and undoubtedly amply-grounded respect for the power and value of
advertising in the American market place. The difference between
the American and West European attitudes may be explained by the
sheer factor of geographical location. The United States is far removed from most of the industrialized countries from which we import
branded products; in contrast the physical closeness of the EEC
countries tends towards the creation of a single market in terms of
the development of good will in the distribution field. The American
viewpoint, however, is far from consistently "territorial," as indicated
by the history of ever-changing and ever-ambiguous Treasury Department Regulations with respect to trademark-holder protection against
imports in cases where the holders of the foreign and domestic trademark registrations are closely related.
The Supplementary Trademark Agreement: Its Utility and Disutility
Under National as Opposed to Treaty Law
In the case at hand, Etablissements Consten had been licensed
to use the trademark "GRUNDIG" by the German Grundig distributing company, which owns that trademark in Germany, France, and all
other relevant countries. Consten had also been put in possession of
the trademark GINT (Grundig International), which had been
registered in France in Consten's name with the understanding that
at the termination of the exclusive agreement it would assign the GINT
trademark to Grundig or allow it to expire. The GINT trademark,
as well as the GRUNDIG trademark, is affixed to all appliances manufactured by Grundig, including those sold in Germany, and, we are
informed by the EEC Commission, "was introduced by Grundig
shortly after it lost a decision in The Netherlands, in December 1956,
against a parallel importer." The Netherlands Hoge Raad (Supreme
39 See Ladas, Recent Trademark Developments in Foreign Countries, 55 TRADEREP. 689, 699-705 (1965). Whether the European Trademark would be based
on the universal or on the territorial principle with respect to the existence or absence
of import-ban privileges vis-i-vis imports from outside the Common Market is, of
mAmc

course,
quite another question.
40

Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) ; EBB, .rupra note
35, at 461-63.
4
1A Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
42 See EBB, supra note 35, .at 467-81, and articles cited therein.
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Court) had ruled at that time that a Dutch importer-distributor
licensed under the GRUNDIG trademark could not ban imports of the
Grundig products by others, on the ground that the trademark ownerGrundig-had exhausted its rights to control the distribution of the
product once it had put the trademarked products into commerce.3 To
avoid this result, the Grundig enterprise adopted the somewhat elaborate circumvention of registering the additional mark GINT in The
Netherlands in the name of the exclusive distributor. It followed the
same practice in the other countries to which it exported, on behalf of
each of its national distributors. 44 Local rather than absentee ownership of the GINT mark, coupled with the fact that the court simply
regarded the Dutch owner as a completely separate entity no matter
how close its economic and financial ties with the German manufacturer, led to the application of the territorial principle and to the
grant of import-ban privileges."
The very fact that the device of employing a supplementary trademark to be owned by the national distributor had been conceived for
the specific purpose of bolstering the distributor's absolute territorial
protection under the national law, rather than for the essential trademark purpose of designating the source of origin of the goods (the
GRUNDIG trademark being sufficient for that purpose), condemned
it in the eyes of the EEC Commission and the court as being patently
and essentially a restrictive practice device. Moreover, the restriction
took the form of partitioning the Common Market along national
boundary lines.
Grundig v. Prins, [1957] GRUR 259.
The Conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer, presented to the Court
of Justice on April 27, 1966, describe the trademark arrangement more fully than do
the preceding opinions. Grundig had obtained an international registration for GINT
under the Madrid Arrangement of 1891 for the International Registration of Trademarks, but thereafter relinquished the derivative rights which it would otherwise have
enjoyed in France (an adherent to the Madrid Arrangement), in favor of Consten.
CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 8046 at 7658, 7668, 7669. On the Madrid Arrangement
generally, see 56 TRADEAPx Ril'. 290 (1966) and EBB, .rpra note 35, at 425-38
(1964). The fact that Grundig had registered the GINT mark under the Madrid
Arrangement, rather than simply obtained or authorized distributors like Consten
to obtain separate registrations in each national territory, seems fortuitous in this case.
4
Judgment of Dec. 4, 1957, GRUR, 557 (Court of the Hague 1959).
In a subsequent decision, N.V. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja v. N.V.
Graetz Nederland, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 366, 370-71 (Gerechtshof, Amsterdam 1964),
the Gerechtshof ruled that the same principle applied to the transfer of a Dutch
trademark by the Dutch branch of a German manufacturer (Graetz K.G.) to a Dutch
company, N.V. Graetz Nederland, that had been established by Graetz K.G. and by
its sole distributor in The Netherlands. The facts that N.V. Graetz purchased the
business of Graetz K.G.'s Dutch branch, including the trademarks, for only 1,000
Dutch guilders, and that there was a "possible close economic cooperation and a
common interest" between the German and Dutch Graetz enterprises were deemed
not to demonstrate that the establishment of the latter was a "bogus transaction," nor
to derogate from its entitlement to exercise import-ban privileges based on its theoretically independent ownership of the Graetz trademark. Id. at 371. A similar
result was reached by the Court of Appeal in the Hague in Grundig Nederland N.V.
43
44
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The Import-Ban Privilege Under French Trademark Law; the Clash
Between Treaty Anti-Cartel Law and National Trademark Law
Thus, the national trademark law and the Common Market antirestrictive practice treaty law come into apparent conflict, and where a
conflict exists treaty law must prevail. However, the nature and extent
of the "apparent" conflict is not clear. The uncertainty results from the
fact that Consten brought two different suits in the Commerce
Tribunal of the Seine-the first, a suit against the parallel importer,
UNEF, claiming unfair competition; the second, against UNEF for
infringement of the GINT trademark. No hearing had been held in
the trademark action when the Commission made its 1964 ruling."
Nevertheless, much of the argument before the Court of Justice was
couched in terms implying that the French decision reviewed by the
Paris Court of Appeal was grounded on trademark infringement as
well as unfair competition.4 7 Of course, in view of the Commission's
ruling on the relevance of the GINT trademark, the Commission and
Court of Justice inevitably had to consider the likely though not
established proposition that French trademark law provides for importban privileges whose exercise was barred by the Commission's ruling.
The fact that the case came before the Court of Justice without a
clearcut ruling by a French court on the trademark import-ban question is emphasized by the repeated reference in argument to Italian and
Dutch case law on this point,48 rather than to French precedents. The
Italian and Dutch cases were cited as a basis for the surmise that in
the instant case the division of the trademark ownership rights between
the German manufacturer, Grundig, and the French distributor,
Consten, would strengthen the judicial protection accorded to Consten
against parallel imports. Grundig had argued that such judicial protection might have been forthcoming in France even if it had retained
its ownership of the French mark, GINT-this argument was made
in support of the proposition that the agreement covering the transfer
to Consten of the GINT mark had not been essential to create the
import-restrictive effect of the mark under French law.49 What basis
v. Ammerlaan, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 373 (Court of The Hague 1964). This device
would not have been so successful in Switzerland, where the Swiss Supreme Court
refused import-ban protection to the Swiss Philips company even when it held a
national registration of the Philips trademarks in its own name. See 51 TREmA c
REP. 141 (1961). The contrast between the Swiss and Dutch judicial views is well
described in Waelbroeck, Trademark Problems in the European Common Market,
54 TRa"msmu REP. 333, 348-55 (1964).
46Decision of the Commission of Grundig-Consten Agreement, 1 CCH Commn.
MIT. REP. 2743 at 1862.
47 See the Conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer, 2 id. at 7658.
48 See, e.g., 2 id. at 7632, 7670.

49 2 id. at 7632.
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may exist in case law for this extreme territorial reading of French
trademark law is not known. But, even if this trademark view were
well grounded, it could not make irrelevant to the issue under treaty
law the pattern of conduct and the restrictive effect sought and apparently achieved by Grundig and Consten. ° The Court, in upholding
the Commission's ruling on the tainted use of the GINT mark as a
restrictive trade practice, simply noted that "Consten's registration in
France of the GINT trademark, which Grundig affixes to all of its
products, is designed to fortify the agreement's built-in protection
against parallel imports with the protection arising out of industrial
property law." "'

Thus, inherent in whatever import-ban privileges a Western
European trademark holder may possess is the possibility of conflict
between the privileges conferred by national law and the competitive requirements imposed by the Treaty, under article 85. Confronted by
American antitrust decrees requiring action or inaction in foreign
countries with respect to industrial property rights in those countries,
the resistance of the European courts and executive departments to
such derogations from national patent and trademark rights has been
vehement, although not always fully effective.' What kind of accommodation of national and community interests can be expected with
regard to private trade restrictions that rest upon import-ban privileges
flowing from national trademark rights held by a sole distributor?
At one extreme, the answer might be that such "ancillary" trade
restraints, representing time-honored privileges associated with industrial property rights, should be preserved by the treaty makers. Indeed, there is a school of thought that finds in article 36 of the Treaty
support for its conclusion that the anti-cartel provisions of article 85
are qualified to this extent. 53 Article 36 cites "prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation . . . which are justified on
grounds of . . . the protection of industrial and commercial property"
50 See the Conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer, 2 id. at 7670.
51 2 id. at 7653.
,5 Compare the protest made by The Netherlands' government against a proposed
decree involving N. V. Philips, and the reaction of British courts against directives
of American courts concerning British-held patents acquired from DuPont, with
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), all discussed in
Exa, supra note 35, at 571-77, 586-98, 623-29.
53See, e.g., OBERDORER, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAw 50 (1963); Ehlers,
Export und Re-Import-verbote in Lizenvertragen aus der Sicht des EWG-Kartellrechts, GRUR, 424-32 (1963), noted at 3 Comm. MKT. L. Rav. 382-83; Hepp, Les
Conventions de License Exclusive au regard des R~gles de Concurrence de la C.E.E.,
SoclAAL ECONOMISCH WERGMtNG 85 (1964), commented upon in 2 Comm. MKr. L.
Rv. 118 (1964); Maddock, Know-How Licensing Under the Antitrust Laws of the
United States and the Rome Treaty, 2 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 36, 65-66. See also the
ruling of the Oberlandesgericht Hamm in the Persil case, supra note 37.
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as grounds for exemption of certain trade restrictions from the effect
of specified articles of the Treaty. But, as pointed out by P. VerLoren
van Themaat, 4 Director-General of Competition of the EEC Commission, the exemption expressly relates only to articles 30 to 34,
which deal with quantitative restrictions imposed by member states on
imports, and does not concern article 85 standards of conduct in the
Common Market area. Grundig and Consten unsuccessfully cited
article 36 in their appeal to the Court of Justice. 5 They were equally
unsuccessful in seeking to invoke article 222, which provides that "the
Treaty shall in no way prejudice the property system in the Member
States."
The approach of the EEC Commission appears to be that, in the
case of exclusive distribution agreements that carve out national
territories for different distributors, the national-law import-ban
privileges of trademark-holders should be deemed curtailed by the
article 85 strictures against private arrangements that distort the freely
competitive market of the EEC. Would this curtailment of the
national-law privileges of the trademark-holder be required by the
EEC Commission even in the absence of a formal trademark agreement such as that present here? Or even if the exclusive distribution
arrangements did not expressly exact from other purchasers of the
product in question an undertaking not to export? The Grundig case
itself involves (a) nationally delineated exclusive distributorships,
(b) parcelling out to national distributors territorially defined rights
in a trademark common to a multi-country market, (c) a formal
trademark agreement, and (d) commitments not to re-export. But
the implication of the ruling appears to be that, even if the last two
factors were absent, the Commission would regard Consten's trademark rights in France as necessarily limited by article 85 for the same
reasons offered in the ruling.
Indeed, in the exercise of its power to make regulations to enforce
article 85, the Commission now appears to have no doubt that the
mere existence of such trademark arrangements, used to bolster
absolute territorial protection for exclusive distributorships, infringes
article 85. Regulation No. 67/67, issued by the Commission to be
effective as of May 1, 1967, treats certain exclusive distribution agreements as exempt under article 85(3) of the Treaty from the anticartel provisions of article 85(1) until December 31, 1972, but this
exemption shall apply only if the possibility of parallel imports is provided for "in order that consumers may share in the advantages resultMArticle 36 in Relation to Article 85 and Patent Licensing Agreements, 1 Comm,
MKT. L. Rxv. 428 (1964).
55 2 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. 7654.
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ing from the exclusive dealership." The exemption shall not apply
when the contracting parties make it difficult to obtain parallel imports, "particularly when the contracting parties exercise industrial
property rights to prevent dealers or consumers from obtaining in
other areas of the Common Market supplies of the products under
contract properly marked and marketed, or from selling them in the
contract territory." (6
Does the Grundig Decision Turn on the Existence of the
Supplementary Trademark Agreementf
In the instant case, did anything turn on the existence of a
supplemental agreement providing for the restoration of the GINT
mark to Grundig or for its cancellation on the termination of Consten's
exclusive distributorship? The existence of the supplemental agreement emphasized the relationship of the trademark to the system of
absolute territorial protection, but it is difficult to see why or how
the absence of so explicit an agreement would have made it permissible
561 id. 112727, at 1819, 1821.
By contrast, article 4(2) (ii) of Regulation 17 of February 6, 1962, see note 4
supra, stated, far more vaguely, that agreements between two enterprises might raise
no article 85 problem if the sole effect of the agreement is (a) to restrict resale price
or other conditions of trading in the resale of goods obtained by one from the other,
or (b) "to impose restraint on the rights of any person acquiring or using industrial
property rights" including patents or trademarks. The "Manual to Firms," the
Commission's "'Practical Guide' to Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty," issued
September 2, 1962, added the commentary that the resale agreements under article
4(2) (ii) (a) were exempt from compulsory notification to the Commission only "in
so far as they do not contain any additional clause involving, for instance, a ban on
exports." 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 2819, at 1970. As for the second category
of two-party agreements generally exempt from compulsory notification-license
agreements-the Practical Guide commented that this classification would include
those "restrictions imposed on the licensee which are inherent in the exercise of the
protected industrial property right itself, i.e., which stem from the fact that the licensor
is exercising his protected right within the limits prescribed or allowed by domestic
law" but "they must be restraints on the exercise of industrial property rights ....
Restraints which no longer have any real bearing on the exercise of the industrial
property right, i.e., which are no longer directly related to its exercise, are not
affected" (that is, are not automatically exempted from the compulsory notification
requirement), and such non-exempt restraints might exist where the licensee "undertakes not to export to another Member State; undertakes to impose competitive
restrictions on his customers." 1 id. at 1970-71.
A close comparison of Regulation 17, the Practical Guide, and the draft proposed
Regulations of August 26, 1966 demonstrates the progression and clarification in the
Commission's thinking on the subject. The Court's decision in Socit6 Technique
Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 118047 (1966),
suggests that, even so, some residual problems may remain. An exclusive agreement
may give rise to an article 85(1) problem "because of a specific factual situation."
Id. at 7697. Such a "situation" might, for example, be actual conduct designed to
prohibit exports and exclude imports, despite the absence of contractual provisions
calling for such conduct. It was argued before the Court in Maschinenbau that such
restrictive practices "are the very conditions for the existence of an exclusive distributorship and do not need to be spelled out to be imposed on the parties." Id. at
7692. Such a course of conduct, if shown to exist, would violate the prohibition contained in new Regulation No. 67/67 against the taking of measures that would block
parallel imports.
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for Consten to use its possession of GINT as an import barrier.
Nevertheless, the extensive arguments presented by the parties and
by the Advocate General in his conclusions before the court indicate
that they regarded its existence as a key element in the case for one
purpose or another. This factor was deemed to bear either on the
establishment of a violation of article 85, or on the justification (vis-ivis articles 36 and 222) of the Commission's injunction barring the
use of the GINT mark to curb parallel imports. The presence of the
supplemental agreement was also cited by the Court of Justice in these
two different contexts as additional evidence of the restrictive purpose
of the overall arrangement and as involving overt action by the parties
beyond the operation of French law.5" However, it may be doubted
that the Court treated the formal document itself as more than a
symbol or makeweight. Even a simple transfer or cession to Consten
of the French trademark right in GINT might well have been deemed
sufficient to constitute either a "concerted practice" by the parties or
an off-shoot of the basic restrictive "agreement" within the meaning
of article 85, and hence improper to the extent used to bar parallel
imports, in the context of the instant case. The essential factors are:
(a) an exclusive distribution network with (or perhaps even without)
export-ban undertakings by the various national distributors, (b) the
peculiarly strong French doctrine of unfair competition with respect
to third parties having notice of an exclusive distribution arrangement
and (c) the inherent import-restrictive potential of the mark under
French trademark law (a potential which all parties assumed to be
present).
European attorneys who have followed the Grundig litigation
closely and an independent evaluation of the arguments of the litigants
suggest that the point is worth detailed scrutiny. At least some of
the European legal fraternity think, in apparent contrast to the Commission's view expressed in Regulation 67/67, that if Grundig and
Consten had carefully refrained from entering into any provable
agreement on the GINT mark itself, the nature of the ruling, or at
least the nature of the decree, would necessarily have been different.
If this be so, Grundig and other European manufacturers in quest of
absolute territorial protection for national exclusive distributors have
a readily available escape clause of some sizable dimensions-an escape
clause founded on what to an American appear to be very formalistic
grounds. To be sure, the Netherlands court decisions of 1956 and
1962 " drew an equally formalistic distinction between the status of
the German manufacturer who retained the Dutch trademark Grundig
67

Id. at 7654.

5S See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
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and that of a separate Dutch company which subsequently held the
trademark right in its own name. The German manufacturer was
denied and the Dutch company was granted import-ban rights under
Dutch trademark law. The distinction seems all the more formalistic
in those cases because the Dutch corporate trademark-holder might
well have been deemed to be the alter ego of the German manufacturer.
But such formalistic distinctions, though apparently acceptable with
respect to the trademark law doctrines of some countries, are of doubtful significance to the application of treaty anti-cartel law."9 Dr.
Fernand-Charles Jeantet, a European scholar in this field, seems to
sense the validity of this proposition in one part of his recent analysis
of the Grundig and related decisions of the Court of Justice. On the
basic finding of a violation of article 85, Dr. Jeantet views the Court
as having used an objective, economic-effect criterion in determining
the significance of the GINT transfer to Consten. The Court did
not confine its evaluation to a single clause (such as the re-export ban
commitments) considered in the abstract, but looked at the concrete
case as one
in which absolute territorial protection attained its maximum
effectiveness as a result of a combination of factors. These
are three in number: the . . . [export-ban clauses], their

especially strong effect on French territory by reason of
[French] case-law on the reach of exclusivity clauses with
respect to third persons who are unfairly competitive . .
and finally the usage made here of the trademark GINT to
lock up completely the market as a result of the exclusivity of
the trademark right. Thus it is the result obtained, of
absolute territorial protection, which is condemned, not this
or that contractual means considered by itself. . .

.o

Inferentially, Jeantet seems to regard the transfer of GINT to Consten,
in the circumstances of the case, coupled with the use or ability to
use the mark to bar parallel imports, as more significant for article 85
than the existence of the supplemental agreement.
5o German anti-cartel law, which stigmatizes certain "agreements" but not (unlike
article 85 of the Treaty) "concerted practices," has been subjected to administrative
and judicial vacillation as between formalistic and substantive interpretations of "agreements." See EDWARDS, TRADE REGULATIONS OvERsEAs 206 (1966); Schapiro, The
German Law Against Restraints of Competition--Comparative and International
Aspects, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 15-19 (1962).
00 Esquisse de la jurispridetce de la Cour de Justice des Communautis sur les
accords restreignant la concurrence [Outline of the Case-law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities on Agreements Restraining Competition], in JuRis
3. Another portion of the
CLASSEUR PERI6DIQuE, Oct. 26, 1966, 2029, at § I,
article suggests that the existence of the supplemental agreement was, nevertheless,
useful to the Court in overcoming objections that it would otherwise be permitting
the Commission to intervene unwarrantedly in industrial property law, an area generally reserved by the Rome Treaty to the jurisdiction of the member states. Id. at
§ I, f 4. See note 67 infra.
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Grundig and Consten, in their argument before the Court, contended that the Commission had erred in finding that the supplemental
trademark agreement constituted an article 85 violation. They argued
that the January 13, 1959 document was merely a unilateral declaration
by Consten rather than an agreement, and that its content, an assurance that Consten would restore the GINT rights to Grundig or cancel
the mark upon termination of the exclusive distributorship contract,
could have no influence upon competition in the French market."1 The
Advocate General, in his Conclusions, argued that this difficulty was
overcome by the Commission's finding that "the registration of the
GINT trademark is based on an agreement of January 13, 1959, which
in part was reduced to writing, which would indicate that besides the
declaration of January 13, 1959, there must exist additional oral
(perhaps only tacit) agreements concerning the trademark." 1 His
reference to a "tacit agreement" comes close to recognition of a less
formalistic view-that, in the full context of the market-fragmentation
plan, the existence of the trademark transfer, even without an explicit
agreement, must have been intended to bolster that plan. This interpretation of his views is confirmed by the Advocate General's next
observation: "This impression is strengthened by the reference in the
decision's statement [i.e., the Commission's statement] of reasons as
to the origin of the GINT trademark. . . . Furthermore, it cannot
be disputed that concerted action on the part of the Grundig and
Consten companies was indispensable" even to make it possible for
Consten to register GINT in its own name.
Is there an echo here
of the presumptive "per se violation" reasoning adopted by American
courts to deal with certain evidentiary problems under the Sherman
Act? It is notable that the Court, in finding an article 85 infringement, spoke simply of the re-export undertakings plus "Consten's
registration in France of the GINT trademark, which affixes to all
of its products"-rather than specifying the supplemental trademark
agreement-as "designed to fortify the agreement's [i.e., the basic
exclusive distribution agreement's] built-in protection against parallel
imports with the protection arising out of industrial property law." 6
412 CCH CoM. MrT. REP.
('

2

8046, at 7630, 7668.

Id. at 7668.

63 Ibid.
64 Id. at 7653.

By contrast, the Court has held elsewhere, in a declaratory judgment, that the mere existence of a sole distributorship agreement stripped of re-export
ban undertakings and other impediments to parallel imports into the country of the
sole concessionaire cannot be deemed automatically to infringe article 85(1). In such
a case, the application of article 85(1) is dependent on a showing "on the basis of all
the objective elements of law or of fact taken together" that there is "a sufficient
degree of probability" that the agreement "is capable of partitioning the market in
certain products between Member States and of thus rendering the economic interpenetration sought by the Treaty more difficult'. Among the factors to be particu-
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Although the Court refers elsewhere to the violation as arising out
of the basic agreement "as well as from the supplementary agreement
on the GINT trademark," I it places no emphasis on the existence
of the formal "supplementary agreement" in contrast to the existence
of the trademark arrangement itselt.
The Court discusses the supplementary agreement somewhat more
fully in connection with a rather different point, but it may be using
the term simply to indicate the existence of some understanding as to
the trademark. As previously noted, Grundig and Consten claimed
that the Commission had violated articles 36 and 222 in
declaring that the agreement on the registration of the GINT
trademark in France serves to ensure absolute territorial
protection for Consten and in thereby prohibiting Consten
from invoking rights stemming from national trademark law
to prevent parallel imports. More particularly, the plaintiffs
[Grundig and Consten] hold that the effect on competition
objected to results not from the agreement but from the
registration of the trademark under French law, which creates
for the holder an original right in the trademark from which,
under national law, the absolute territorial protection is
derived. 6
In rebutting this argument, the Court emphasized the abusive traderestrictive manipulation of the trademark to serve as a means to make
it possible to control and prevent parallel imports. It thus distinguished the enjoining of such abuse of trademark rights from the
article 222 pledge that the Treaty "shall in no way prejudice the
property system in the Member States." To make clear the existence
of a competition-distorting abuse of the trademark, the Court emphasized Grundig's indispensable participation in an agreement with
Consten to permit the latter to register GINT in its own name in
France. But such reference to trademark "agreement" is not necessarily pegged to the written supplemental agreement of January 13,
1959, which, after all, mentions only Consten's obligation to return
or cancel the mark at the end of its distributorship. It is keyed, rather,
to the overall understanding between Grundig and Consten as to the
purpose and effect of the trademark arrangement, as that understanding
was discerned by the Court from the very nature of the circumstances
larly taken into account in making this appraisal is "whether the clauses protecting
the exclusiveness are rigid or possibilities are left open for other channels of trade
in the same product through re-exports and parallel imports." Soci&t6 Technique
Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., CCH Comm. Mrm. Rx. fr 8047, at 7695-96
(1966).
65 Id. at 7654.
66
Ibid.
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of the transaction, given the background of the Dutch Grundig
decisions. 7
To be sure, if Consten had merely adopted a trademark of its own
that Grundig permitted it to affix in France, and if the mark did not
correspond with a like-sounding mark used generally by Grundig outside of France, there would presumably have been no claim by either
Commission or Court of an article 85 violation based on trademark
abuse. But that procedure would have been very different in intentand-effect from the GINT arrangement.6 8 Applying the intent and
effect reasoning still further, the objection to the GINT arrangement
as a means to bolster market Balkanization should survive whether or
not any portion of the Grundig-Consten trademark accord was reduced
to writing. More speculative, but perhaps inherent in this reasoning is
the belief of this American observer that the existence of both a network
of exclusive distributorships, each confined to a national territory, and
a trademark arrangement of the GINT-Grundig type, even in the absence of explicit re-export ban undertakings and a written undertaking
to restore the trademark, would be found to infringe article 85 by both
the Commission and the Court. Certainly if the Commission found
that a distributorship trademark arrangement which included the
parcelling out of trademarks among the territorial distributors implied
a set of commitments not to re-export, and if by combining the explicit
with the tacit agreements it concluded that the trademark-curmexclusive-national-distributorship arrangement provided absolute territorial protection, it would be difficult for the Court to hold such
fact-finding unwarranted.69 The negative implication of the Commission's Regulation of May 1, 1967 1o is that the Commission might
67 Dr. Jeantet, in his discussion of Grundig, emphasizes this reference to the trade-

mark agreement as enabling the Court to substantiate its claim that the GINT
arrangement constituted "fraude 5. la loi"-that is, abuse of right at trademark lawand as enabling it in its decree to escape the charge that it has "encroached on the
domain reserved to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Member States." JURIs CLASSEUP,
supra, note 60, § I, f[4. Whether or not Jeantet intended to refer technically to
the existence of the supplementary agreement, his point would be equally well made
by reference to the trademark arrangement as such, without regard to Consten's
written declaration.
G5 Another variation of the trademark arrangement, of course, might simply be
Grundig's retention of French registration rights in the GRUNDIG and GINT marks,
with the local "authorized" distributor being formally or informally licensed or permitted to import and sell the products so marked. Whether or not this would constitute an attempted "agreement" or "concerted action" to misuse the trademarks for
added territorial protection, becomes a moot point since many if not all Common
Market countries would withhold the import-ban privilege in those circumstances.
See, e.g., the Netherlands, German and Italian decisions discussed infra at p. 883.
French trademark law presumably follows this body of case-law, and, indeed, it was
precisely because of this view that Grundig put the GINT mark into Consten's hands
in 1959.
69 Recall the Court's reasoning in Technique Miniire, supra note 64.
70 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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find that this kind of trade-restrictive conduct violates article 85 (1),
and that the Regulation would not accord such conduct automatic
"class" exemption under article 85 (3).
Export Bans Without Trademark Transfers: National Unfair
Competition Doctrines
What combined national-treaty-law result would flow from a
distribution arrangement in the Common Market accompanied by
overt export-ban agreements, without supporting possession of a trademark registration by the exclusive distributor? On the national law
plane, considered apart from treaty law, the Dutch cases suggest
that-at least in The Netherlands-the parallel importer would not be
barred on unfair competition grounds. 71 In the event that national
law in another EEC country " extended unfair competition concepts
to protect the exclusive distributor from parallel imports, even without
the trademark support, the logic of the EEC Commission's opinion in
Grundig would indicate that article 85 of the Treaty should be deemed
to override and curtail such a view of unfair competition. This conclusion may seem inconsistent with the Commission's ruling in the
Grosfillex matter,7 3 where it granted "negative clearance" to this
kind of distribution arrangement, finding that the arrangement did not
violate article 85(1) of the Treaty. In that case, however, the contract ran between a French manufacturer of plastic products and a
Swiss distributor, and the exclusive territory was Switzerland, a nonEEC country. The Swiss distributor undertook, inter alia, not to
resell these or other competitive products in the Common Market area.
With respect to the Grosfillex products themselves, the Commission
concluded that article 85(1) would not be infringed, on the ground
that such resale, involving as it would a recrossing of the customs
frontier between the Common Market and Switzerland, would not be
commercially feasible. Whether or not the Commission was correct
in its analysis of the minimal restrictive impact of the agreement, 74 its
analysis does indicate that it would be prepared to distinguish the
Grosfillex situation from a purely Common Market arrangement.
7 Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja
N.V., 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 205 (Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) 1962). See
also Ebb, Common Market Law in Process, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 489, 503-05 (1966).
72 E.g., France in the instant case, as indicated by the discussion, infra p. 880,
of the French doctrine of "opposabiliti aux tiers" under the law of unfair competition.
73 See Decision of the Commission of the European Economic Community, March
11, 1964, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 237 (1964).
t4 See Ebb, stpra note 35, at 677-78. See also Fulda, The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the European Economic Commission, 65 CoLJm. L. REv.
625, 627 (1965).
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The 1962 opinions of the French courts in the first Consten suit
(which ultimately reached the Court of Justice), and in a similar suit
against la Soci6t6 Willy Leissner at Strasbourg, do not turn upon
the ground that trademark rights of the sole distributor were infringed in any technical sense by the parallel imports. Instead, the
unfair competition charge that underlay the trial court's injunction
against UNEF was based on the broader ground that the parallel
importer had unjustifiably injured the sole distributor because it had
knowledge of the sole agency agreement and willfully disregarded
it. To be sure, the finding of injury was based in large part on
the ground that UNEF was unfairly exploiting Consten's trademark
rights. However, this finding was cast not in terms of trademark
infringement as such, but rather in the broader context of the unfair
advantage taken by UNEF of an exclusive importer's obligation "to
assure advertising to make a trademark known, a warranty service,
[and] post-sale servicing, which perhaps contributes to the good reputation of the mark." ' By use of this expansive definition of unfair
competition, and in the absence of legislation similar to state fair
trade laws in the United States which bind "non-signers" of a distribution agreement, the court indicated that it would use its equitable
powers in the broadest possible manner to protect a closed system
of distribution which it viewed as operating to protect consumers
from interloping distributors. Quoting an earlier ruling of the Paris
Court of Appeal, the trial court noted that
if the exclusive [distributor] contract achieved the objective
of extensive advertising, sale of the products by a third party
constitutes a refusal to recognize the exclusivity and suffices
to characterize the competition [as] unfair, and, generally
speaking, the case law and the textbooks agree that an act,
whereby a person acquires rights knowing that he thereby
encroaches upon the vested interest of another, constitutes
a tortJ 6
75 Accord, Cie. Francaise Telefunken S.A. v. Ets. Aubin & Ets. Pucci, summarized
in considerable detail in 2 CCH Comm. MIYT. REP. ff 9088 (Tribunal de Commerce de

Marseille 1964).

76 See also Annot., 1 Comm. MxT. L. REv. 223 (1963). The tort doctrine of
interference with contractual relations, as developed in the United States, does not
appear generally to have been carried so far as to warrant judicial enforcement
of "non-signers" clauses unless the manufacturer of the product were protected by a
statutory grant, e.g., under the federal patent laws or under state fair trade laws.

Compare Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-05
(1911), with Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
187-88, 191 (1936). See OPPEIHEim, UNFAiR TRADE PRAcCicES 926 (1st ed. 1950).

Justice Holmes, the sole dissenter in the Dr. Miles case, would have endorsed the
French view emphatically: "I cannot believe that in the long run the public will
profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior
purpose . ..of their own . . . ." 220 U.S. at 412.
The close spiritual relationship between the French and Holmesian views on
unfair competition as permitting private import bans, and the territorial view of
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The Advocate General, in his Conclusions presented to the
Court, further described the French doctrine of "opposabilitg aux tiers"
under the law of unfair competition, as construed by the highest courts,
as going
extremely far (in contrast to other legal systems) by making
it possible to make claims based on unfair competition
against third parties who, in spite of knowledge of an exclusive distributorship system, skirt the contractual licensees
and purchase goods elsewhere for distribution in the contract
territory. Hence, under French law an exclusive distributorship contract, if sufficiently publicized, furnishes in and of
itself sufficient possibilities to enforce a territorial protection,
and in fact the plaintiffs in this case have also repeatedly
and
7
with success availed themselves of those possibilities.

It should be recalled at this juncture that the Court of Justice
modified the Commission's ruling by providing that the exclusive distribution system, when stripped of its illicit factors, should be deemed
not to violate article 85 unless the Commission furnishes reasons to
demonstrate why it considers it necessary to prohibit the agreement
as a whole. Upon remand, the Commission could conceivably find
such a reason in the fact that a French court might continue to apply
the very broad French doctrine of unfair competition (as distinguished
from trademark infringement) and, despite the Commission's injunction against Consten's use of the import-ban potential of the tradetrademark infringement caused by parallel imports, is strikingly illustrated by Justice
Holmes' opinion, speaking for the Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S.
689, 690-92 (1923) :
The plaintiff [A. Bourjois & Co., which had purchased the French company's
business in the United States, together with its good will and American
trademarks]

. . . has spent much money in advertising, &c., so that the

business had grown very great and the labels have come to be understood by
the public here as meaning goods coming from the plaintiff.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff's [trademark] rights are infringed.
. . . Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them with a
specific mark. . . . It is said that the trademark here is that of the French
house and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate.
It is the trademark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in
law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the
plaintiff although not made by it. . . . It stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.
772 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 8046 at 7657, 7672 (Court of Justice of The European Communities, Hearing of Apr. 27, 1966). See Markert, Les contrats d'exclushiiM en droit allemand de la concurrence,REvuE TRiMEsrTRIE.i
DE Daorr EuROPEEN,
Jan.-Apr. 1966, 66, at 74. The German courts appear to apply unfair competition
concepts against "outsiders" in similar fashion. See, e.g., Judgment of June 14, 1963,
40 BGHZ 136, reported sub noin. In re "Braun" Elec. Razors, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
59, 72-75 (1964), with which, however, should be compared In re Vat 69 Whiskey,
5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 74, 76-79 (Oberlandesgericht Dfisseldorf 1964). The latter
decision advocates applying a far less stringent doctrine against outsiders in cases
involving only interference with a manufacturer's sales network, in contrast with
cases involving interference with a resale price maintenance system.
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mark itself, permit Consten to enjoin imports of Grundig products
by parallel importers. However, it seems unlikely that a French
court would consider itself empowered to give so wide a scope to the
unfair competition doctrine in the circumstances of this case, particularly in the light of the substance of the ruling by the Court of
Justice. Even Grundig, in urging the Court to sustain the exclusive
distribution agreement stripped of objectionable elements, conceded
that approval should be conditioned on the discontinuance of the undertaking to prevent parellel imports."' The Court's actual ruling, while
obscure on this point, probably should be viewed as tacitly incorporating such a condition, or as sanctioning the Commission's imposition of such a condition."9
Accommodation of Resale Price Maintenance Law and
Treaty Anti-Cartel Law
One final level of conflict between national and treaty law in
the Grundig litigation remains to be noted. Under German national
law, resale price fixing, which is allowed to manufacturers of branded
goods, when properly registered with the German Federal Cartel
Office, cannot be enforced against nonsigners unless the initiator of
the distribution arrangements has set up a systematic and comprehensive system of protection. Where exports are involved, the system
78 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP, at 7657.

7 In its decision of July 8, 1965, in the D.R.U. Blondel case (Diepenbrock en Reigers N.V. ["D.R.U."] and Etablissements Blondel S.A.), the E.E.C. Commission went
even further than this in finding a violation of article 85(1). D.R.U., a Dutch manufacturer of household products, gave an exclusive distributorship for France to the
French firm Blondel. No re-export ban commitment was given by Blondel (and, if
we can assume that other exclusive distributorships were granted for the other E.E.C.
countries, no other such commitments appear to have been exacted). No transfer
of the French registration of the D.R.U. trademark appears to have been made to
Blondel. Despite the availability of the broad French doctrine of unfair competition
as a possible prop for absolute territorial protection, the Commission found expressly
that "Blondel has not placed its contract in opposition to a third party and declares
that it has no intention of doing so." REvuE TRImEsTRIrr.T DE DRorr EUROPAEN,
Jan.-Apr. 1966, p. 159 [the translation is that of the author]. However, the Commission found that an undertaking by D.R.U. not to deliver to France other than to
Blondel "thereby preventing any French enterprise other than Blondel from purchasing
D.R.U. products directly from it constituted a substantial enough restraint on
would-be third party traders of these trademarked products to infringe article 85(1).
On the other hand, the Commission found this to be a relatively mild restraint particularly because D.R.U. had not undertaken to refrain from indirect deliveries to
the concessionary area and because "its distribution system does not prevent third
parties established in this zone from being able to obtain these products in a manner
other than from the sole distributor, and the parties have not tried to obtain absolute
territorial protection by preventing parallel importation by other means." Id. at 161.
Sales prices in France were not higher than in the country of origin, and the restraints
were minimal. Accordingly the Commission exercised its discretion under article
85(3) to exempt this arrangement from the prohibition of article 85(1). The rule
of the case appears to be codified in article 1 of the new Regulation No. 67/67 on
"group exemptions," effective as of May 1, 1967.

More generally, the lesson of the

case, not surprisingly, is that a restraint in an exclusive distributorship system may
be deemed substantial enough to infringe 85(1) but so minimal and innocuous as to
warrant exemption under 85(3).
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must necessarily include contracts providing for bans on re-export of
the product from one national territory to another."o These contractual arrangements, to be enforceable, must be Nicikenlos, i.e.,
"closed", or free of loopholes. If the export-ban assurances in EEC
trade are held to violate article 85 of the Treaty, they are obviously
ineffective, and conceivably could render the comprehensive system of
private territorial controls more luckless than iickenlos. Indeed, in
the Braun Electric Razors case, a German appellate court decided that
a private system of price and trading restrictions that included exportban clauses was not comprehensive because of its belief that the reexport prohibitions violated article 85. The German Supreme Court,
on appeal, found this a premature conclusion, on the ground that the
re-export prohibitions in that case were still presumptively valid despite
article 85."' But it refused to decide what the legal consequences would
be under German national law if the export prohibitions were declared
to be void under article 85 by competent authorities. Nevertheless,
it is difficult to believe that the doctrine of Lickenlosigkeit, as a prerequisite to entitlement to resale price maintenance in Germany, would
or could persist unaltered in content in the face of the Court of Justice
decision upholding the Commission's ruling in the Grundig case. The
seeds of change in the internal law may well have been sown in the
Maja case. s2
Accommodation of National Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
With Treaty Anti-Cartel Law
One may also foresee, even before a European Trademark Convention becomes effective, changes in domestic trademark and unfair
competition principles in response to the affirmance of the Grundig
ruling and the issuance of the new Regulation. Precise reformulations
of national law may well vary among the EEC countries: some may
trim their doctrinal revisions to exempt products of their EEC
partners from import bans; others may adopt more sweeping
reformulations.
We have surmised that the sheer transfer of a French trademark
held by a German manufacturer to an exclusive distributor in France,
when the mark is affixed to all of the German products sold in
Europe, even in the absence of export bans imposed on other dis80 See, e.g., Judgment of June 14, 1963, 40 BGHZ 136, reported sub norn. In re
"Braun" Elec. Razors, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 59 (1964); In re "Agfa-Optima" No. 2,
3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 87, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP'. 1f8020 (Oberlandesgericht Munich
1964); Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja
N.V., 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 205, 212-15 (Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) 1962).
81 Judgment of June 14, 1963, 40 BGHZ 136, reported sub norn. In re "Braun"
Elec. Razors, 3 Comm. Mkt L.R. 59, 76-78 (1964).
82See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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tributors and without a supplemental agreement to retransfer the
trademark at the end of the distributorship, would be deemed by the
Commission and the Court of Justice to infringe article 85 because of
its potential nationalistic compartmentalizing of trade in the trademarked product. If this speculation is well founded, what room is
left within the national trademark law of the Common Market
countries for the trademark holder's privilege of banning imports of
the "genuine" trademarked product by parallel distributors?
In a typical distribution network situation, the local trademark is
owned either by the foreign manufacturer or by the local distributor.
When it is owned by the foreign manufacturer himself (with a license
or other form of authorization running to the local distributor), the
national trademark law of most if not all Common Market countries
had come to regard the manufacturer-trademark-owner, even before
Grundig, as lacking an import-ban privilege. The rationale for denial
of import-ban privilege to the manufacturer is either that he has
exhausted his trademark right with the first sale of the product in or
from the country of manufacture, or that no consumer deception as to
source of the goods can occur with respect to him.s3 If the foreign
manufacturer put title to the local mark in the hands of the local distributor, case-law, at least in The Netherlands and Italy, would have
permitted the distributor to exercise import-ban privileges before the
Commission and Court of Justice decisions in Grundig. After
Grundig, no such privileges can be deemed to flow from national
trademark law in any EEC country because of the pre-emptive impact
of EEC Treaty law, at least in situations affecting commerce within
the Common Market. Under the reasoning of the Commission and
the European Court in Grundig, it is difficult to see how any national
distributor importing from another Common Market country and
armed with exclusive distributor rights and trademark title in any
EEC country, could exercise import-ban rights or privileges without
affecting EEC trade.8 4
83 Clearly this is so at least in Germany, see the Maja case, discussed in the text
accompanying note 37 mrpra; The Netherlands, see the 1956 Grundig case, discussed
in the text accompanying notes 43-45 supra; and Italy, see the Colgate-Palmolive
case, at note 42 .supra, and especially the dictum of the court in [1957] II Rivista Di
Diritto Industriale 358 at 361:
When the same person owns a trademark which he has registered in more
than one country, the fact that the goods, after the trademark has been lawfully affixed, are brought from one country to the other is irrelevant from
the point of view of trademark protection. The exclusive right may not conceivably be violated in such a case, since the mark which appears on the
imported goods is the authentic trademark of the enterprise which owns the
exclusive right in the country of importation.
84 The German manufacturer of Persil detergents could continue to bar imports
of goods made by an unrelated manufacturer in Holland under the same mark, as
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One real but very limited possibility for effective continuance of
a Grundig-like distribution system may exist. If the manufacturer
wishes to go to the trouble, it may establish its own subsidiaries in
each of the EEC countries as the exclusive national distributors, and
permit these subsidiaries to hold title to the trademark locally as in
the case of GINT. Such an arrangement might be legally permissible
for two major reasons. First, national trademark law may permit
the local subsidiary, despite its close connection with the foreign
manufacturing parent, to exercise an import-ban privilege. As to this
point, recall the Dutch decision on the local Graetz distributing subsidiary, as contrasted with Swiss trademark law.' And, secondly, with
respect to Treaty cartel law, it has been argued that the wording of
article 85 (1), which bans restrictive agreements between "enterprises"
and "associations of enterprises," does not interdict such agreements
as between a parent and a subsidiary company because the companies
constitute merely a single enterprise."6 But this contention has not been
resolved by the administrative or judicial organs of the Community
under the Treaty of Rome. Even assuming that a network thus
organized could accomplish, without violating article 85(1), the compartmentalizing objectives as the existing Grundig system cannot, it
would require the manufacturer to set up his own sales subsidiaries
throughout Europe. It was presumably to avoid this necessity and its
attendant administrative and other burdens that Grundig has relied
largely on independent distributors. It has not been doubted that a
manufacturer, if it were willing to do so, could go one step further and
establish a reasonably effective distribution network operated within
a single integrated corporate structureY'
Accommodation of National and Treaty Law When the Product Is
Imported From Outside the Common Market
Suppose the EEC country distributor and the parallel traders have
imported the trademarked product from outside the Common Market.
permitted by the German appellate court in the case cited in note 37 supra. But, it
will be recalled, no international distributorship arrangement existed there as between
the German and Dutch enterprises, and the holding of the German trademark was
not as a result of agreement with the Dutch manufacturer.
85 See note 45 .rpra.
86 Compare OnmnoRR, GLaiss & HIRSCH, CoMMON MARKEr LAw 2, 3, 13-16
(CCH 1963), with EuRop'gs RuLEs OF CoMPzrrrioN 80, 85 (Business International
1966). See generally GRAUpNER, supra note 15, at 11; Duwel, Signification du Mot

"Enterprise" dans le sens de l'article 85 du Trait4 C.E.E., ii propos d'accords entre
soc.tis nzires et filiales et filiales entre elles, REVUE TRIMESTRIELjx DE DROIT ErROPEEN 400, July-Sept. 1966; Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition-Comparative and International Aspects, 62 CoLJM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1962).
87 See, e.g., the opinion of the Court of justice in Grundig, making clear that such
an operation would not run afoul of article 85(1), at any rate. 2 CCH Comm. MrT'.
REP. 8046, at 7651.
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Is there any reason to believe that national trademark law would still
confer upon the exclusive distributor, and that Treaty anti-cartel law
would permit him to enjoy, import-ban privileges that the Grundig
ruling bars if the product emanates from another EEC country? The
Grosfillex ruling of the Commission "s subjects an exclusive distributorship, granted by an EEC manufacturer to a Swiss distributor, to an
export ban to protect the EEC manufacturer from re-import into the
Common Market. In such special circumstances, treaty law would
doubtless permit a French manufacturer-trademark-owner to invoke.
against re-imports from Switzerland the protection of the French unfair competition law and whatever trademark import-ban protection
may exist under French national law. But this is a very narrow exception. If the same French manufacturer is also utilizing an exclusive
distributorship network in the Grundig manner, within the Common
Market area, he would be unable to invoke French trademark or unfair
competition law to assure his own absolute territorial protection vis-Avis re-imports from other Common Market countries.
If the Grosfillex situation is reversed, and manufacturers outside
the Common Market export to exclusive national distributors in
EEC countries, will the trademark import-ban privileges of the distributors (assuming they have been vested with the local trademarks)
be broader under the national trademark law because the parallel importer's source of supply of the trademarked product is a nonEEC
country? Treaty anti-cartel law would apparently permit the drawing
of such a distinction (assuming that Grosfillex has survived Grundig).
But would the courts choose to preserve under national trademark law
a privilege so narrowly confined that its perpetuation would smack of
trademark as well as nontariff trade discrimination against the world
outside the Common Market? With the permissible scope of the
trademark import-ban so sharply curtailed by treaty law, the courts
must re-interpret legislative intent embodied in trademark and unfair
competition statutes to determine whether the legislature, in the
absence of any specific new legislative pronouncement, would wish to
perpetuate so truncated a privilege, and one whose application would
involve judicial schizophrenia.
Moreover, it is unlikely that a foreign manufacturer would provide absolute national territorial protection to one, and only one,
exclusive distributor within the Common Market. More likely, such a
manufacturer would rely not simply on one national distributor but
on two or more exclusive distributors within that area, the distribution
88 Discussed in the text accompanying note 73 supra.
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areas being defined by reference to national boundaries. GrundigConsten and Regulation No. 67/67 would then appear to be as
applicable as if the basic source of supply were a manufacturer situated
within the Common Market.
Consideration of the structure of the distribution system for
British whisky, as disclosed by recent European judicial opinions, may
help sharpen the issue. Vat 69, a Scotch whisky, is exported to an
exclusive distributor in Germany who, like similar distributors in
other countries, has exclusive marketing rights in his own national
territory, and is subject to a re-export ban. Unauthorized distributors,
however, have imported Vat 69 into Germany from The Netherlands
and South America. 9 The authorized distributor sought unsuccessfully in German courts to enjoin interference with the exclusive sales
network. The German courts refused to apply unfair competition remedies against strangers to the contractual arrangements, even in the
period preceding the Court of Justice decision in Grundig. ° In the
post-Grundig period, German courts will presumably be no more receptive to pleas for the invocation of unfair competition protection against
imports in these circumstances, whether the goods originate inside or
outside of the Common Market.
Will their attitude be different if a trademark right is involved?
In the actual Vat 69 case, the German trademarks were still held by
the Scotch manufacturers, and hence could not-consistently with the
doctrine of the Maja case-be the basis under German law for protection against imports from any country. Assume, however, that
the Scotch manufacturers were now to follow the Grundig pattern
and transfer the German trademarks to the sole distributor in
Germany. Treaty law under Grundig should preclude use of national
trademark privileges as a basis for barring the flow of Vat 69 into
Germany from The Netherlands, or from any other EEC country.
Would German courts nevertheless enjoin parallel imports of Vat 69
from South America even though they would not ban imports from
EEC sources? Since South American shipments could be rechanneled
through Dutch merchants, the only result of obtaining a German injunction in those circumstances, if one could be obtained, might be to
embark upon a round-robin of litigation in other EEC jurisdictions.
89 Other cases show variations on the same theme: imports of Scotch into France
from a parallel exporter in England, Socidt6 B.A.P. v. Soci&t6 Madimpex, 2 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. 9075 at 8160 (Commerce Court of the Seine 1964); and from
a parallel exporter in Denmark, Pierre Rivi re & Cie., S.A. v. Maison du Whisky,
2 CCH CoMm. MYrT. L. REP. 9075 at 8160 (Commerce Court of the Seine 1963).
90 In re Vat 69 Whisky, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 74 (Oberlandesgericht, Diisseldorf
1964).
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THE GRUNDIG-CONSTEN CASE

The strong German insistence upon the prerequisite of Liickenlosigkeit,
previously noted in the resale price maintenance area, extends to unfair
competition law with respect to the protection of a manufacturer's
sales network. 1 This in itself might dissuade German courts from
extending trademark import protection in so fragmented a manner to
a system so far from foolproof.
Great Britain's formal application for adherence to the European
Economic Community, presented in May, 1967, suggests a further
dimension to the problem. If Britain ultimately becomes a member
of the Common Market, its trade with the original six membtrs of
the EEC will be directly and fully subject to the article 85 prohibition
on restrictive practices affecting "competition within the Common
Market." Correspondingly, Regulation No. 67/67 of May 1, 1967
then would apply by its terms to British-German trade. Absolute
territorial protection for an exclusive distributorship, including the
assertion of import-ban privileges that might otherwise exist under
trademark rights, clearly would be banned not only with respect to
distribution of Vat 69 Scotch in Germany but also, conversely, with
respect to Grundig products in Britain.
A more difficult question will be posed if a manufacturer outside
the Common Market designates a single distributor to cover the
entire EEC area, exacts an undertaking not to re-export from that
area and transfers to the distributor national rights to a common
trademark in each of the EEC member countries. The manufacturer
may utilize a set of exclusive agreements similar to those in the
Grundig-Consten case, but the areas to which they apply would be
countries outside of the Common Market, plus the EEC as a whole.
If this ban on parallel imports into the EEC area and on re-exports
from it to third-country areas were enforceable, competition within
the Common Market would be reduced, but in terms that relate primarily to the flow of products between the Common Market and the
outside world, rather than exports from one member country to
another. Will Treaty anti-cartel law and national trademark and unfair competition law protect the sole EEC distributor against parallel
imports into the Common Market area? The EEC Commission has
not yet answered this question. The Grosfillex ruling is suggestive,
but by no means determinative. The substantial distortion of the
flow of imports into the Common Market, engendered by the provision
of absolute territorial protection of that Market by an outside manufacturer, has a far greater potential for causing a restriction on or
91 See id. at 78-79.
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distortion of competition as among the member States than was
likely to be the case in Grosfillex.
The fact situation disclosed in United States v. Holophane Co.,"
is instructive and illustrative, though more extreme. A British
company entered into patent and trademark agreements with a French
company in 1921, licensing the latter to manufacture and sell prismatic
glassware under the "Holophane" trademark in Western European
countries, including France, Belgium and Italy. The French company
undertook to ban exports from the licensed countries to other areas,
and the British licensor undertook to prevent exports of Holophane
products into France or the other licensed countries. Presumably
Germany and the Netherlands were isolated as protected distribution
areas. Under Grundig-Consten and Regulation No. 67/67 such an
agreement would infringe article 85 (1). If the Holophane agreement
is still alive today, however, it may have been modified to expand the
French company's territory to include the whole Common Market
area, while letting stand the export restrictions as between the British
and French companies. Among the questions raised by such an
arrangement are: would it be permissible under Regulation No. 67/67?
If not barred by that Regulation, would it be an improper restriction
on trade under the broader provision of article 85 (1)? Should the
EEC Commission be concerned about international cartel agreements
between an enterprise within, and one outside, the Common Market
when the restrictions on trade do not apply expressly as between one
member State and another, although they may be presumed to have
an effect upon the inter-State trade? The phrases "trade between the
Member States" and "competition within the Common Market" sound
inherently more limited in applicability than, in a different geographical
context, the Sherman Act's reference to "commerce among the several
States, or zuith foreign nations." Even so, if an international cartel
arrangement of the type here described has demonstrable impact on
trade and competition within the Common Market, the EEC anticartel provisions should be applicable. 3
92119
93

F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
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THE GRUNDIG-CONSTEN CASE

The Role of the National Judiciary in Harmonizing
National and Treaty Law
At least in the anti-cartel area, progress in the development of
EEC Treaty law involves a great deal of potential development and
change in national law, and reflects a process of inteiplay between
treaty and national law. The role of the national judiciary in interpreting national legislation and legal doctrines against the background
of treaty law will be most important. Constitutional law in some
EEC countries, for example Article 55 of the French Constitution of
1958, expressly provides for the superior authority of treaty provisions
over national law. Even in the absence of an explicit statement of
treaty supremacy, and even before coming squarely to grips with the
problems of treaty violation, it seems likely that national courts will
increasingly construe internal law so as to avoid risks of conflict with
EEC treaty obligations, whenever the ambiguous or changing state of
the local law permits such interpretation. One may venture the
speculation that the drama of the evolutionary process will be found,
in the long run, in this subtle interplay and in the absorption of treaty
standards by national law, by a process of judicial (in default of
legislative) harmonization, rather than in confrontation and combat
between clearly-defined treaty law and clearly-defined antithetical
national law.

